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Japan is in the process of a profound economic and business transformation, which has been underway for 
some time and will take perhaps another five years or more. Japan is moving toward a less regulated and more 
market-oriented economy, to a more open and competitive economy, and to an economy in which the informa-
tion technology revolution is beginning to spread rapidly, transforming competitive conditions for firms and 
markets. Thirty years ago, agriculture and textiles may have characterized the "old Japan", while the "new 
Japan" included steel, automobiles, and consumer electronics. Today's "old Japan" refers to large, well-estab-
lished firms in many heavy industrial sectors, the banking system, and the large trading companies. Unlike 
agriculture, many firms in these industries are transforming themselves by restructuring and investing in 
information technology in order to be effective participants in Japan's evolving economy. There are major new 
features of what is currently called the "New Japan." On February 11, 2000, the Center on Japanese 
Economy and Business, the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business and the Center for 
International Business Education of Columbia University, and Sumitomo Corporation of America, hosted a 
one-day international conference to explore these and related issues. Distinguished scholars, senior business 
executives, and young, successful entrepreneurs participated in a series of panel discussions to assess the macro-
economic environment in Japan; the incipient explosion in Japan of venture capital activities, new Internet 
firms, and e-commerce; foreign Merger and Acquisition and foreign investment in Japanese industries; and 
the implications of these changes for the Japanese and American economies. Excerpts of their presentations are 
presented below with highlights of the intra-panel and audience discussions. 
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JOHN H. MAKIN 
Japan's macro prospects are 
still very dim, but they can 
easily be remedied - although 
that does not seem likely. The 
quarterly annualized rates of 
domestic growth in Japan 
through the third quarter are -4, 
-2.1, -5.2, -1, +7.3, +4.3, -5.2, 
and -3.7 percent. These num-
bers are not reflective of a 
recovering economy. 
Over the past several years 
1 have seen things in Japan that 
I thought would only be seen 
in text books: a liquidity trap 
and full Ricardian equivalents 
in fiscal policy. Basically, the 
fiscal picture is so bleak that 
fiscal stimulus does not work 
because the private sector 
anticipates higher future taxes 
and puts aside funds in order 
to pay them. The net effect on 
aggregate demand from fiscal 
stimulus is quite limited, if 
not absent. 
The past several years on the 
policy and economic fronts are a 
familiar story, but worth a brief 
review. In the summer of 1995, 
there was a yen surge and the 
economy collapsed. The first 
major liquidity crisis in Japan 
led to massive monetary and fis-
cal stimulus and hopes of recov-
ery in 1996. Those were fol-
lowed by consumption tax 
increases and increases in house-
hold co-payments on health 
insurance, In 1997, the econ-
omy re-collapsed, along with the 
rest of Asia. The end of 1997 
was marked by crisis, with the 
failure of a brokerage firm and a 
bank, and 1998 ended with very 
large negative numbers on 
growth. In the middle of 1998, 
the Obuchi government admin-
istered massive fiscal stimulus. 
Japan went to a zero interest 
rate policy early in 1999, and 
currently, in the third quarter, 
growth at a nearly minus 6 per-
cent annual rate with a 2 per-
cent plus, bringing it to 4 per-
cent coming from the external 
sector. Meanwhile the yen 
appreciated by approximately 14 
percent from the middle of 
1999 until now, suggesting that 
in the future the external sectors 
contribution will not be great, 
What is wrong? Broadly 
speaking, in the 1980s the 
Japanese private sector invested 
too much. In the 1990s, Japan 
proved that the public sector 
invested too much. There are 
even prefectures in Japan refus-
ing to accept the largess of the 
govemment that would enable 
them to undertake another pub-
lic works project. The reason, 1 
think, is that people are begin-
n ing to realize that the prospec-
tive tax bu rdens from this inces-
sant fiscal stimulus are great. 
O n e p rob lem is tha t domes -
t ic demand is very weak, and 
the o n l y e f fo r t , s o f a r , t o keep 
d e m a n d from collapsing has 
been to have the governmen t 
borrow m o n e y and spend it on 
pub l ic works, and /or spend i t 
o n transfers to non-viable busi-
nesses. T h e 20 tr i l l ion-yen spe-
cial loan program to small bus i-
nesses in 1998-99 was 
essentially a program one could 
qualify for only if it was impos -
sible to get a loan from anyone 
else. Preserving non-viable busi-
nesses is no t the way to s t imu-
late an economy toward sus-
ta ined growth . 
A second prob lem is persist-
en t deflationary pressure. If t h e 
central bank is too t igh t , then 
even targeting nomina l interest 
rates at zero can lead to m o n e -
tary po l icy that is too t ight , and 
it has in Japan. H o w else does 
one explain the fact tha t in the 
second half of 1999 the yen 
appreciated whi le growth s lowed 
down? Th i s means that mone-
tary policy is too tight . 
Japan's third problem is a 
cont inued failure to address a 
dysfunctional banking system . 
T h e banks experienced very 
large losses during t h e 1990s. In 
1998 , it looked like the govern-
m e n t was toying wi th the idea 
of closing weak banks and sell-
ing off the assets. However, in 
the summe r o f 1998, the new 
O b u c h i government elected to 
prop-up the banking system and 
allow the banks to struggle 
a long w i t h weakened balance 
shee ts. T h e banks were also 
allowed to participate in the 
p r o g r a m o f mak ing loans to 
non-viable businesses through 
subsidized activities provided by 
the Min is try of Finance. If one 
looks at t h e behav ior of bank 
loans over t h e past six mon t h s , 
it is very disconcert ing. T h e 
annua l grow th of broad l iqu idity 
and credi t in Japan is decelerat-
ing. T h e reason is that banks are 
in the bus iness of borrowing 
m o n e y from the Bank o f Japan 
at 0 basis po in t to 1 basis point , 
buying some government bonds 
at 5 to 2 0 basis po ints , and they 
are n o t m a k i n g any loans. There 
is a massive rift between a 
vibran t micro-sector in Japan 
and a disastrous macro-sector. 
H o w does one remedy this? 
First, macro-economic 
restructuring must con t inue, 
even if it is initially deflationary. 
Restructur ing Japanese compa -
n ies t ha t are burdened wi th h igh 
cos ts means that people get laid 
off. T h i s s imply exacerbates the 
nega t ive pressure on domes t ic 
d e m a n d tha t comes from pros-
pect ive higher taxes. A necessary, 
but n o t a sufficient condi t ion 
for Japan to ge t back on track is 
to revive private-sector aggregate 
demand, and that will require 
tha t t h e Bank of Japan adop t a 
m o d e s t inflation target, perhaps 
0 t o 2 percent . Th i s target is 
under considerat ion bo th by the 
Bank o f Japan and the Liberal 
Democra t ic Party. 
Second , monetary policy 
needs to set an inflation target 
and the government must s top 
expending immense amounts o f 
publ ic funds o n projects tha t are 
not going to produce any returns 
for Japan's aging popu la t ion . 
T h e governmen t needs to 
concentrate o n r e c o n s t i t u t i n g 
the b a n k i n g system as a n o n -
dysfunct ional opera t ion. T h e 
government also needs to concen-
trate on t he problem tha t , w h e n 
the e c o n o m y does recover, in ter-
est rates will return to 3 pe rcen t 
and the s tock o f d e b t will pro -
duce a considerable burden. 
I t h ink there is great p rom ise 
in the micro-sector. However , 
t he government and the cenrrat 
bank are major impedimen ts to 
the process, and they need to 
undertake obv ious and sharp 
changes in their pol icies . 
HEIZO TAKENAKA 
T h e Japanese e c o n o m y is a typi-
cal dual economy , compr ised o f 
two symbo l ic camps, wh ich I 
will call countries . O n e is the 
seaside country, opened to the 
global c o m m u n i t y and u n d e r 
s t rong in ternat iona l compe t i t i on 
pressure. Based upon this , 
Japanese businesses have been 
increasing rheir product ivi ty and 
profitability due, in large part, 
to the information technology 
arid genet ic technology revolu-
t ion. T h e second country , which 
is called the moun ta in s ide coun-
try, is strongly regulated and 
p ro tec ted by the government . 
Today, die moun ta ins ide people 
are s t rengthening the walls 
around their coun try to protect 
their vested interests . These two 
countries are fighting each other. 
In Japans e c o n o m i c recovery 
scenario, the seaside c o u n t r y will 
absorb the mounta inside coun-
try fairly easily. T h i s is the prob-
lem of structural reform. There 
are two types o f restructuring 
reforms: reactive and proactive 
restructuring. Consider t he case 
of non-performing assets a n d 
the fiscal deficit. Non-per form-
ing assets shou ld be wr i t t en off 
as soon as possible. Fur ther , the 
current budge t deficit is no 
longer sustainable, even if w e 
expect a very quick recovery o f 
the Japanese economy . T h e gov-
ernmen t b o n d - G D P ratio will 
continue to expand. W e need 
fiscal rehabilitation b y increasing 
taxes or decreasing gove rnmen t 
expenditures . 
Ano ther impor tan t con-
straint to consider is t he d e m o -
graphic changes in Japan. T h e 
total popula t ion in Japan will 
begin to decrease in 2 0 0 8 . W c 
(the Econom ic Strategy 
Counc i l ) believe that t he po ten-
tial growth rate o f the Japanese 
economy will be s l ightly higher 
than 2 percent. However, in 
eight years the po ten t ia l growth 
rate will also start to decline. W e 
wou ld like to recover at least the 
primary balance o f t he budge t 
before 2 0 0 8 . We shou ld start 
the process o f fiscal rehabilita-
t ion around 2 0 0 3 . 
W h a t are the basic teasons 
for Japan's s low e conom ic 
growth in t he 1990s? In the late 
1980s, the average grow th rate 
was approximately 4 .5 percent . 
It was a period o f h igh growth . 
I n the 1990s , t h e average 
growth rate was 1 percent. One 
reason for the stagnation of the 
Japanese economy was the so-
called debt hangover problem, 
which the government is respon-
sible for repaying overtime. 
We should not expect a very 
quick recovery of the Japanese 
economy considering the rea-
sons for the stagnation. The year 
2 0 0 1 was. a very importan t year 
originally. There were originally 
three shocks of the Japanese 
economy. First is the introduc-
tion of a limited bank deposit 
system. However, the return to a 
limited deposit insurance system 
has been delayed to April 2002. 
By introducing this limited 
bank protection system, the 
banks should completely write-
off their non-performing assets. 
Second, the international 
accounting standard will be 
employed. Two important fac-
tors accompany this: one is that 
a consolidated balance sheet is 
necessary for all big businesses 
and, second, a current market 
value assessment will be needed. 
By doing so, banks cannot con-
ceal any hidden losses. This will 
provide the third shock which is 
to accelerate the writing off of 
non-performing assets, 
In the current political situa-
tion in Japan, the bureaucrats 
have monopolized the policy-
making process. Mr. Obuchi's 
style has been to convene many 
advisory groups, including the 
Economic Advisory Group. He 
also formed the Council on 
Industrial Competitiveness, and 
a Twenty-First Century Vision 
Council. The dynamics between 
the coalition parties, the LDP 
and the bureaucrats will decide 
what policies will be mandated 
from now on. The basic scenario 
is that restructuring should con-
tinue and we will see some 
deflationary impact. 
DAVID WEINSTEIN 
One important lesson drawn 
from Japan's experience with 
monetary policy comes from the 
depression. In 1930-31, Japans 
growth performance was rela-
tively poor, ranging from fairly 
high positive numbers to practi-
cally zero. Until Japan pulled off 
the gold standard, the yen 
depreciated by slightly over a 
factor of two. From that point, 
Japan began growing at about 
ten percent pet year. I think 
there is evidence in Japan that 
substantial monetary shocks, 
such as increases in money sup-
ply and devaluations of the cur-
rency, can have some real effects. 
My assessment of the situa-
tion is that the Bank of Japan 
does not want to do monetary 
targeting. The Bank has decided 
it is a committed inflation 
fighter and does not want to 
give up on its credibility. Given 
that the Bank of Japan has a 
commitment not to do inflation 
targeting, what are some of the 
escape strategics? O n e op t ion is 
for the Bank of Japan to target 
the yen rather than inflation. 
The best way to drive the yen 
down is to say the yen is too 
high at 100 and should be at 
120 or 130. The statement 
alone would have an enormous 
impact without having to do too 
much printing. However, if the 
Bank of Japan turns out to be 
completely intransigent and is 
unwilling to implement this 
type of policy, then the Ministry 
o f F inance can c u t investment 
taxes. For example, tax cuts can 
be in the form of accelerated . 
depreciation allowances for busi-
ness investment in order to 
stimulate investment spending. 
This would require that the 
Ministry of Finance give up 
some of its budget targeting. 
In terms of the Ministry of 
Finance and budget deficit 
issues, I believe Japanese budget 
policy has not been very effec-
tive. Many of the Japanese stim-
ulus packages implemented 
were temporary tax measures— 
and they are very temporary. 
They will not produce much 
economic stimulus and one 
should not be surprised that 
there have been Ricardian 
equivalents. I would not con-
clude that a sustained tax cut 
would be ineffective. Rather, I 
think the effects tend to be 
reduced. The Ministry of 
Finance tends to sabotage them 
by stating that it will raise taxes 
in the future. The same sabo-
tagc exists in monetary policy 
when the Bank of Japan states 
that it will print money, but 
then stop if there is inflation. 
Further, I am not convinced 
that the size of the Japanese 
budget deficit is a cause of con-
cern because the actual struc-
tural levels of expenditures and 
deficits have not been that high. 
The debate over the level of the 
Japanese debt is also unclear. If 
the deficit is measured in terms 
of gross debt, the number is 
horrendous. However, if the 
deficit is measured in terms of 
net debt, it is not that bad. 
With respect to the banking 
sector in Japan, I think there are 
two major problems. One is 
adverse selection. Banks are 
unwilling to lend to firms 
because there is a lack of trans-
parency in the books. Second is 
moral hazard. There are many 
insolvent banks and if they 
make an investment that does 
not pay off then they remain 
insolvent. However, if the 
investment does pay off then 
they can become solvent. This 
creates a strong incentive for 
banks to make very risky invest-
ments, or funnel money into 
companies that are bad projects. 
Q & A 
Q: Why is there a simple c a u s e 
and effect into fiscal 2002 
between deposit guarantees and 
the postponement of economic 
recovery in Japan? 
TAKENAKA: That is basically a 
short- and mid-term problem. 
The Japanese economy is still in 
the process of debt hangover 
and this problem will not end 
until the guarantee system is 
normalized. Once this happens, 
banks will be pressured to write 
off their non-performing assets 
very quickly. In the short run of 
that process, deflationary pres-
sure will occur. To ease the 
deflationary pressure, we should 
provide some fiscal stimulus. 
Q: Can you justify the 
inflation targeting policy 
based on historical experience 
in other countries? 
MAKIN: Deflation is an unusual 
phenomenon and the number of 
actual cases where targeting of 
modest inflation from 0 to 2 per-
cent helps to solve the problem 
are limited. The Bank of England 
has adopted an inflation target 
that seems to be working fairly 
well. In the U.S., there are 
examples of deflation episodes 
being remedied by inflation tar-
gets. For example, it was found 
that monetary expansion aimed 
at causing prices to rise was 
helpful and was associated with 
some recovery. Dealing with 
deflation is not an easy problem 
to solve. Deflationary expecta-
tions can be persistent and 
dynamically unstable. I raised 
the issue because self-reinforcing 
deflation is the biggest macro 
disaster that can befall a country, 
and it should be avoided at all 
costs, even at the risk of setting 
an inflation target of 0 to 2 per-
cent and having a short period 
of 3 percent inflation. • 
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HIROSHI MIKITANI 
I would like to discuss Rakuten's 
activities as well as explain about 
the Internet and e-commercc in 
Japan. Rakuten was formed in 
1997 and started service in May 
1997 with 13 stores and six staff 
members. Today we have about 
2,000 stores and 100 staff mem-
bers, and the number of stores is 
growing about 200-300 per 
month. We hope to have 5,000 
scores by the end of this year. 
Approximately 200,000 items 
are available for sale on our 
website. Rakuten has a variety of 
stores, including small grocery 
stores, and large stores including 
five of the top-ten department 
stores in Japan. 
Rakuten provides a shopping 
platform for business users to 
sell their products in an auction 
and non-auction format. We 
charge our merchants a fixed fee 
of $500 per month for a small 
store, $1,000 for a medium-size 
store, and $2,500 for a large 
store. We also sell a tremendous 
amount of advertisement space 
on our website. Rakuten is rated 
number three according to 
Access Ranking and is consid-
ered the most popular e-com-
merce on-line shopping mall in 
Japan. Our monthly turnover is 
about ¥1.3 billion ($13 million 
per month) and it is growing at 
a rate of 10-20 percent monthly 
gross. We have 2.5 million page 
views daily, growing about 20 
percent monthly. 
Unique to Rakuten is the 
development of our own 
e-commerce software. Other 
Japanese e-commerce sites, 
mostly run by large Japanese 
companies, usually purchase 
packaged software from vendors 
like IBM and Microsoft. How-
ever, four years ago we decided 
to develop our own sophisti-
cated software, instead of buy-
ing it, because we believe it is 
one of our core strengths and we 
can better meet the expectations 
of our merchants. It is not easy 
to customize packaged software. 
We have signed an agreement 
with Microsoft and have subse-
quently become the recom-
mended e-commerce site by 
Microsoft network. They have 
also decided to enter a partner-
ship agreement with Rakuten 
because it will take an immense 
amount of time to develop the 
type of software we use. 
Included in the fixed 
monthly fee. Rakuten provides 
its merchants with consulting 
services, five types of software 
packages and traffic. We are 
trying to combine the applica-
tion-service provider model 
with the franchise model. 
Internet commerce is a human 
touch service and Rakuten uses 
Internet technology to enhance 
communication between sellers 
and buyers. We have also started 
consumer-to-consumer (C-to-C) 
auction, like e-bay, and we are 
the largest C-to-C auction site 
connecting consumers. 
The Japanese e-commerce 
market is expected to bring in 
between $2-3 billion annually 
and it is growing rapidly, but we 
are about 1—2 years behind the 
U.S. We are seeing an explosive 
growth in business-to-consumer 
(B-to-C) and also B-to-B market 
currently, and it is expected that 
the market will grow to $415 
billion by the end of 2003 . The 
number of Japanese Internet 
users is also growing quickly. We 
have more than 20 million 
users. One of the largest trends 
in Japan is the mobile phone 
that N T T DoCoMo has intro-
duced. They have gained close 
to 4 million users in nearly one 
year, which is much faster than 
America Online did in its initial 
startup years. Japan also has 
more diverse users. About 50 
percent of Rakuten users are 
female, compared to 30 percent 
for the U.S. 
YASUYUKI ABE 
Presidio Venture Partners is 
Sumitomo Corporation's ven-
ture capital arm. Although our 
value is largely related to the 
operations of our parent com-
pany, Presidio distinguishes itself 
by simply being an agent of cor-
porate venture capital. With this 
new approach to the market and 
treatment of the parent com-
pany's capital, Presidio has con-
fronted a number of difficult and 
challenging issues. Nevertheless, 
we have fortunately been able to 
demonstrate our capability in a 
relatively short period of time. 
Presidio has invested approxi-
mately $25 million in 30 com-
panies, from which eight com-
panies have already exited. 
Today the value of our portfolio 
exceeds $ 100 mi l l ion. 
Through the process of 
establishing Presidio Venture 
Partners, we encountered many 
internal and external challenges. 
As you all know, very quick and 
decisive action is required to 
play in this industry If we were 
to follow Sumitomo's tradi-
tional, lengthy application 
process for each new investment 
opportunity we encountered, we 
would surely miss the chance to 
make many good investments. 
In a groundbreaking change to 
the cautionary mind-set of the 
Japanese trading company, 
Presidio was granted authority 
to make its own judgements 
and, subject to some limitations, 
Presidio is able to invest without 
parent company approval. 
Presidio's focus is on infor-
mation technology and Internet-
related business. To be an early 
stage investor in Internet ven-
tures is a matter of intuition, 
intelligence, and keeping up 
with the speed of the game. 
No matter how quick and 
responsive we have designed 
Presidio to be, our success in 
the U.S. and J apan as a venture 
capitalist really depends on 
whether we can satisfactorily 
contribute value to new ven-
tures. We cannot play a simple 
financial role. The ability to 
give proper suggestions and 
advice to the new venture and 
to help steer the new venture to 
its own independent success is 
an important function for any 
venture capitalist. Presidio must 
utilize its core strengths and 
assets to contribute meaning-
fully to this process. 
Presidio's business model was 
developed around a basic tenet 
of not competing with U.S. ven-
ture capitalists. Presidio tries to 
maximize the value of a new 
venture by working together 
with the U.S. venture capitalist. 
If we participate in Asian or 
Japan-supported ventures, we 
try to bring in an U.S. venture 
capitalist so that they can add 
their value to these operations. 
Presidio's value lies in the 
vast experience, insight, and 
expertise we can access through 
our parent company's regular, 
ongoing business, especially in 
Japan and other countries out-
side the U.S. We think that the 
value of the U.S. venture capi-
talist is: (1) to give guidance to 
the management team of the 
new venture; (2) to contribute, 
recruit, and replace members of 
the management team as neces-
sary; (3) to utilize their portfolio 
companies to enhance the value 
of the new venture; and (4), in 
the case of top tier venture capi-
tal firms, to lend their brand 
name to the new venture, which 
is very effective when the ven-
ture is presented to the invest-
ment bankers and the capital 
markets. Presidio recognizes that 
in the U.S., our value is not 
considered equal to that of a 
prernier U.S.-based venture cap-
ital firm. Nevertheless, we can 
contribute to the development 
of the ventures' plans to expand 
into international markets. In 
particular, we can give invalu-
able advice to the management 
team on how to do business in 
Japan As we expand our partici-
pation in the U.S. venture mar-
ket, we, too, can identify and 
broker synergistic relationships 
between the new venture and 
our portfolio companies. 
In the case of Japan, we 
believe Presidio can play a sig-
nificant role. I believe that the 
venture capital business model 
will be the new growth model 
for Japanese trading companies. 
This means our profits will be 
derived from capital gains that 
are created as a result of our 
contribution to the business, 
and not from receiving commis-
sions off the transactions that 
the new businesses create. 
Occasionally, Presidios func-
tion and image are confused 
with that of a corporate venture 
capitalist. Recognition by the 
venture market of our corporate 
heritage can at times be to our 
advantage, but it can u l t imately 
lead to a conflict of interest. 
Sometimes new ventures are 
eager to access our resources and 
envision the establishment of 
joint venture operations with 
Sumitomo Corporation. We also 
receive requests from the 
Sumitomo affiliate companies 
and/or sales departments to 
secure the sales rights for new 
ventures. Since Presidio's mis-
sion is to maximize the value of 
new ventures we must analyze 
the potential of the new venture 
and decide the most effective 
way to bring the venture to new 
markets and new clients. 
Depending on the nature of the 
new venture, their most suitable 
channel to the Japanese or Asian 
markets may not necessarily be 
through our group of affiliated 
companies. As a venture capital-
ist, Presidio should maintain a 
neutral position toward the tra-
ditional business model of our 
parent and legacy affiliates. As a 
general policy, Presidio will not 
itself enter into joint ventures or 
sales agreements with the ventures 
in which it has invested, nor will 
it ever insist on sales rights from 
its portfolio companies. 
Presidios philosophy is 
unique among Japanese compa-
nies and it exemplifies the new 
way of Japanese trading compa-
nies, Presidio has successfully 
completed its first two years of 
operations. Leveraging what we 
have learned from our experi-
ence here in the U.S., we are 
going to start a similar and com-
plementary operation in Japan 
in the near future. Currently, we 
are in the process of establishing 
a new venture fund in Japan 
together with a leading U.S. 
venture capitalist. This is an 
exciting new opportunity and, 
a l though t h e pace in Japan is 
still slow, Japan is changing and 
entering a new era. 
GENE MOSES 
E-Steel Corporation is a busi-
ness-to-business marketplace for 
buying and selling steel. It is a 
global marketplace for a global 
market valued at approximately 
$700 billion in transactions 
annually, and represents the 
world's largest industry without 
an organised marketplace. As a 
result, we believed it presented 
significant opportunities for 
reintermediation — an opportu-
nity to bring buyers and sellers 
together while cutting out mid-
dlemen. Currenty, E-Steel has 
120 employees and 1200 differ-
ent companies that are members 
of our site. Similar to other 
internet companies, we have 
fairly small revenues, no profits, 
and a pret ty good valuation for 
a private company. Our sites are 
also on an IPO (initial public 
offering) this year. 
We have recently announced 
a joint venture with Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi trading company. 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi lend their 
support and buying relationship 
with Nippon Steel to this ven-
ture, while E-Steel adds speed. 
We take experience and turn it 
into a product, and we take 
feedback from that product and 
change it over and over again. 
Each month we present a new 
release by adding an enhance-
ment or rcfinement to market 
needs with a level of speed 
unmatched in both the U.S. and 
Japan. Our organization is inno-
vative and ready to react and 
respond quickly to market 
changes. E-Steel has a 20 per-
cent stake in the joint venture, 
and Mitsui and Mitsubishi are 
at 40 percent each. 
The market for steel in Japan 
is very closed in terms of new 
entrance or changing buyer-sup-
plier relationships. As a result, 
E-Steel had to change its busi-
ness model in Japan to meet the 
needs of the local market. In the 
U.S. and other parts of the 
world, E-Steel brings together 
buyers to meet new suppliers, or 
brings together suppliers to 
expand their customer base. 
However, in Japan, that really is 
not an option. 
Our goal in Japan is to 
streamline the current process 
between existing buyers and 
suppliers and their current busi-
ness relationships by cutting 
costs, creating a c o m m o n data 
platform, and by streamlining 
the process from the initial buy 
to the delivery of the steel. It is 
a new way of doing business 
with the same partners and it 
was important for E-Steel to be 
associated with some high-pro-
file players with real experience 
and knowledge about the 
domestic industry. 
Q & A 
Q: E-commerce in the U.S. 
is shifting the business para-
digm creating more com-
petition, new market entrance, 
more efficiency, and price com-
petition. Looking at what 
is evolving in Japan, what are 
i ts def ining features? 
MIKITANI: E-commerce has 
improved the efficiency of the 
U.S. market. I also think the 
Internet will completely redefine 
the Japanese economy. For 
example, much to the surprise 
of many Japanese securities exec-
utives who believed e-trading 
would never take off, 50 compa-
nies started e-trading since last 
October. Before e-trading, 
Japanese security companies 
were charging 3 percent on the 
turnover of trading. Currently, 
HIS Securities is charging just 
S5.00 for each transaction. It 
used to be that one would pay 
$600 as a commission for a 
$ 2 2 0 , 0 0 0 transaction . If o n e 
looks at PC distribution in 
Japan, Dell computer is way 
ahead of Japanese traditional 
computer manufacturers because 
they are using e-commerce suc-
cessfully. In my view, the 
Internet is a powerful tool and it 
affords Japanese companies the 
opportunity to bypass and disin-
termediate regulations. 
MOSES: There are many differ-
ent values by e-commerce. One 
can see the difference between 
books and CDs. In Japan, for 
example, consumer products are 
delivered through convenience 
stores compared to items in the 
U.S. where they are delivered to 
the front door. This is due to 
distribution costs. However, 
every business poses a different 
challenge to e-commerce, and 
this is where knowledge of one's 
space, and the ability to react, as 
one's industry evolves, proves to 
be the foundation. E-STEEL 
has many years of industry expe-
rience, but we have seen the 
evolution of how e-commerce 
has changed the local steel 
industry. Consequently, 
e-STEEL can help our partners 
in Japan react as they begin to 
see the changes in Japan. 
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S t r u c t u r a l Change 
i n C o r p o r a t e Japan 
Since Prime Minster Obuchi 
took office in 1998, the 
Japanese government introduced 
stimulus packages on an unpre-
cedented scale, accompanied by 
financial reform laws and low 
interest rates. With all of these 
policies now in place, the year 
2000 should be a year in which 
the business sector takes the lead 
in lifting up the Japanese econ-
omy. It is encouraging to learn 
that business leaders are finally 
regaining confidence in bringing 
about a private-sector led eco-
nomic recovery. 
Are Japanese corporations 
really changing? Many Japanese 
corporations are undergoing 
restructuring. It is up to corpo-
rate executives to increase the 
number of good performing 
companies. I believe we should 
accelerate the movement 
toward the Anglo-American 
management model. Many suc-
cessful corporations are shifting 
to this globally accountable 
corporate system. 
Four signs illustrate how 
Japanese corporations are trans-
forming themselves into a more 
competitive corporate structure. 
First, there is a shift in Japanese 
corporate management to share-
holder value. As Japanese corpo-
ration- come under close 
scrutiny by shareholders, higher 
corporate performances are 
expected. Second is the intro-
duction of the consolidated 
accounting system, scheduled 
for April 2000. This system will 
inevitably enhance transparency 
as well as force corporations to 
focus on their core competen-
cies. The third aspect is that cor-
porations are establishing qual-
ity corporate governance by 
introducing external board 
directors and by separating board 
members and corporate officers. 
By inviting directors from out-
side, management can hear 
impartial and varied opinions 
about their corporate strategies, 
allowing them to make revisions 
that are more competitive. 
Separating board members from 
corporate officers strengthens 
the role of the board since it 
separates the audit function 
from business operations. 
Finally, human resources man-
agement is changing. Many 
corporations now emphasize 
employability over seniority and 
lifetime employment. 
A dramatic increase in 
inward foreign investment is 
another engine for corporate 
change. The value of inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the first half of 1999 
exceeded that of 1998, of which 
34.1 percent was in the finan-
cial sector, and about 24 per-
cent was in information tech-
nology and retail industries. 
Japanese corporations, particu-
larly in the 1980s, achieved 
high performance through the 
pursuit of efficiency, such as 
quality management. I do not 
deny the importance of effi-
ciency, but in today's global 
competition, we must also be 
effective. To do so, we need 
greater exposure to different 
values, which in many cases are 
brought about by inward FDI. 
FDI, in addition to the money, 
brings in investors' perspectives 
and corporate management 
styles that are not only new but 
also applicable to traditional 
Japanese enterprises. Conse-
quently, FDI contributes in two 
ways: it strengthens competition 
and creates new markets. 
Another important factor 
that will encourage private-led 
economic growth is the Japanese 
desire to pursue competition 
and entrepreneurship, and the 
lessening of opposition to the 
infusion of foreign capital. For 
example, more Japanese are wel-
coming the merger of Nissan 
and Renault, counting on 
Nissan's revival, while admitting 
that the revival cannot occur 
without painful corporate 
restructuring, such as layoffs. 
Further. Japanese people are 
focusing more on employability 
rather than lifetime employ-
ment. For instance, according to 
one study, only 6.3 percent of 
Japanese think that the seniority 
system should be maintained, 
while 53.8 percent think that 
performance-based salaries 
should be introduced. 
The immediate task of the 
Japanese private sector is to 
place the Japanese economic sys-
tem in a position where it can 
meet the principles of a market-
oriented economy. However, 1 
believe that the future direction 
of Japanese corporations lies 
beyond the market-oriented 
economy. Companies should 
continually create societal value 
by paying attention to all stake-
holders. In aiming to balance 
the interest of all constituencies, 
I believe we must consider cor-
porate management not just 
from a corporate perspective, 
but also from the perspective of 
society as a whole. 
What should the vision of 
a good society be, and what 
kind of philosophy should 
function as the backbone of 
such a vision? I suggest that it 
is necessary to focus on four 
aspects of governance; corpo-
rate governance, governance of 
society, global governance, and 
individual governance. Inevit-
ably, realizing decent capitalism 
or balancing market interest 
and public interest is impossi-
ble without individual gover-
nance—conscience and sound 
judgement. 
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GE Capital's activities in Japan 
over the last four to five years 
can be clustered into five 
groups: (1) consumer financing. 
including private label credit 
card businesses around the 
world; (2) specialty insurance, 
including mortgage companies; 
(3) specialized financing, which 
is GE Capital's equity business; 
(4) equipment management, 
which is an operating lease busi-
ness, including rail cars, ship-
ping containers, and trailers; 
and (5) mid-market financing, 
including commercial equip-
ment finance (which I run). 
Commercial equipment finance 
is the second largest income 
producer in GE Capital. It is a 
global business currently in 16 
countries, including Japan. 
Our investment in Japan, as 
of the end of last year, has 
grown dramatically, but clearly 
there is more to be done. We 
have invested quite a bit in 
Japan and the potential of 
investing there is promising in 
terms of market size. We think 
there is a huge opportunity in 
financial services, GE Edison 
Life, which is our life company, 
is number three in the market, 
and our consumer finance busi-
ness, which is number five, is 
actually booming. In leasing, 
we are number four or five in 
the market. 
GE Capital is in Japan to 
stay forever. We have had real 
opportunities over the last five 
years to enter through a merger 
and acquisition (M&A) vehicle 
in a way we thought was both 
safe and could result in acquir-
ing big positions. The continu-
ing distress and restructuring 
opportunities in the financial 
sector is a huge M&A opportu-
nity. We currently have plat-
forms and people in place who 
know how to underwrite in 
Japan. They also know how to 
write risk and understand legal 
and regulatory risks. Over the 
next couple of years, GE 
Capital is poised to do a lot of 
acquisition through the plat-
forms we own. 
Our most recent acquisition 
was Japan Leasing, which turned 
out to be a unique opportunity 
for GE Capital. As you know, 
the Long Term Credit Bank 
(LTCB) declared bankruptcy in 
September of 1998. We were 
fortunate to have known Japan 
Leasing very well and had com-
peted against them in other 
parts of the world. We also 
knew their managers to some 
extent. Our strategy was to enter 
the bankruptcy early on, and 
make a bid. In the end, we 
managed to cut a deal in six 
weeks. We did a month's work 
of due-diligence and sent over 
100 people just for the leasing 
company. In this case, speed was 
very much to our competitive 
advantage. However, it is not 
typical of M&A in Japan. 
GE Capital is also investing 
in the Internet both within the 
operating businesses and also as 
equity players in certain funds. 
We think there is a first mover 
advantage in operating compa-
nies to become Internet-capable 
and Internet-fulfillment 
providers. We are putting lots of 
money into our internal 
Internet application, and believe 
that rhe business-to-husiness is 
bigger than the consumer mar-
ket. Many Japanese households 
do not have PCs because of the 
cost for the hardware and the 
telephone line. However, every-
one knows how to use the PC 
at work. Getting B-to-B con-
nections on the Internet is not 
an issue at the workplace, but it 
is going to take longer on the 
consumer side. Therefore, we 
see a big advantage of doing 
business over the Internet. 
We have also learned some 
very important lessons along the 
way. First, it is very important 
to promote GE and GE Capital 
as a single company in Japan. A 
brand name is very important. 
Second, government plays a 
huge role in M&A activity a.s 
well as what goes on with 
respect to financial services regu-
lation. Unfortunately, we have a 
long way to go before we gain 
independence, although we are 
getting there with the help of 
restructuring. Remaining inde-
understanding of how to build 
reserves. If you want to do 
acquisitions in Japan, I highly 
recommend having the right 
people there full-time. 
Another large issue for GE 
Capital centers on our employ-
ees. One of the things we did 
while buying assets in distressed 
situations was to leave much of 
the senior management from 
the old company intact. Now 
we need to figure out what hap-
pens in terms of continued 
restructuring. We are downsiz-
ing largely through attrition and 
early retirement, rather than 
doing wholesale layoffs. 
Implementing Jack Welch in 
pendent is very important for 
GE Capital. We do not want to 
be partners with captive finance 
companies. In terms of making 
deals, one needs to do diligence 
in a coordinated manner, just as 
anywhere else. One must under-
stand legal accounting and lan-
guage when trying to write con-
tracts as well as have a solid 
Japan must be modified by real-
ity and we are having some real 
success with that. We are build-
ing in performance pay and 
have transferred a number of 
management techniques to our 
businesses in Japan with suc-
cess. Over time, we will find the 
right size for these companies as 
we push forward. 
ARTHUR MITCHELL 
As the old saying goes: "percep-
tion is reality. For many years, 
the perception was that Japan's 
markets were closed to foreign 
trade and investment. This was 
certainly true in the 1950s but 
in a gradual and sometimes 
contentious manner, Japan has 
slowly liberalized access to its 
markets. The reality has changed, 
but many of the old perceptions 
remain. Old Japan hands advised 
that joint ventures were the only 
practical method of entry into 
the Japanese market in most 
cases because "greenfield" opera-
tions were too expensive and 
various legal, regulatory and 
non-tariff trade barriers made 
corporate acquisitions impracti-
cal, if not impossible. But there 
is now substantial evidence 
that this reality has changed so 
radically that perceptions are 
changing as well, 
Where are new opportunities 
to be found in Japan? Merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity 
is definitely on the rise in Japan. 
In 1999 , there were 1,160 
reported transactions with a total 
value of ¥6.74 trillion. M&A 
transactions in Japan, for the 
most part, have involved few for-
eign parties but there ate signs 
that many sophisticated foreign 
investors now consider Japan as 
a venue where market entry, or 
an enhancement of existing lev-
els of business, is possible and 
practical. The years 2000 and 
2001 will offer opportunity, as 
the combination of structural 
reform, distressed asset sales, 
debt restructuring, and a slow 
economic recovery present 
attractive occasions for strategic 
investments by foreign investors. 
It is expected that new acquisi-
tion opportunities for Japanese 
and foreign companies will 
appear among the following tar-
gets: (1) emerging companies 
with proven technology and 
products; (2) non-core divisions 
of large companies (including 
keiretsu); (3) companies that 
have excessive non-performing 
assets, but still have a strong core 
business; (4) companies in the 
formal reorganization process; 
and (5) family-owned companies 
facing successor problems. 
Three of the recent transac-
tions include Cable & Wireless, 
GE Capital and Boehringer 
Ingelheim. In June of 1999, 
Cable & Wireless (C&W) suc-
cessfully completed a tender 
offer for the shares of Inter-
national Digital Communi-
cations, Inc. (DC). This was a 
hostile bid in the sense that 
IDC's management rejected 
C&W's first offer and recom-
mended that the shareholders, 
Toyota and Itochu being among 
the most prominent, accept the 
N T T offer. This prompted 
C & W to make a tender offer 
directly to the shareholders at a 
price which was ultimately more 
than N T T was willing to pay. I 
think the significance of this 
transaction is that the other 
Japanese shareholders were will-
ing to sell their interests to a 
foreign buyer for a better eco-
nomic return, as opposed to a 
more established domestic 
player, at a lower price. 
Over the last twenty-four 
months, GE Capital has been 
successful in buying Japan 
Lease, one of the leasing affili-
ates of the Long Term Credit 
Bank (LTCB), and Lake, a con-
sumer finance company, as well 
as in forming a joint venture to 
succeed to the future insurance 
business of Toho Life Insurance 
Company. GE took interesting 
steps to limit its exposure to the 
bad debts of the target compa-
nies. In the case of Japan Lease, 
a significant part of the pur-
chase price was deferred until a 
point when it becomes clear 
how much of the company's 
leasing assets could be collected 
upon. In the case of the Toho 
deal, Toho's insurance business 
was separated into past and 
future business. A new joint 
venture company was estab-
lished and Toho's insurance 
license was transferred to it. 
Both firms reportedly put in an 
equal amount of capital, but 
GE holds 90 percent of the 
shares with voting rights. About 
90 percent of Toho's employees 
joined the new company. Toho 
subsequently filed for liquida-
tion under the bankruptcy law, 
but to date it appears that the 
trustee will not attack the joint 
venture transaction. 
Boehringer Ingelheim, a 
German pharmaceutical com-
pany; recently made a. success-
ful hostile takeover bid for a 
"blocking interest" in SSI, a 
Japanese pharmaceutical com-
pany. On the other hand, 
M&A Consulting, a Japanese 
private equity group, has made 
a tender offer for all of the 
shares of Shoei, K.K., a trading 
company with electronics and 
real property interests. These 
ate the first hostile tender offers 
for publicly traded companies 
since World War II. 
Some recent legal amend-
ments have very significant 
implications for deal- structur-
ing. Given the bias toward risk 
avoidance, it is extremely diffi-
cult to have two compensation 
systems within the same organi-
zation. As a way around this 
problem, some companies are 
thinking of taking advantage of 
amendments to the Anti-
monopoly Law which permit 
the establishment of holding 
companies. In theory, it may be 
possible to place employees who 
wish to be compensated based 
upon performance in one affili-
ate, and those who prefer the 
lock-step system in another. 
New legislation has been 
passed which will make it easier 
to restructure the Japanese com-
pany. One law will permit the 
buyer of a company to freeze-
out minority shareholders by 
compelling them to exchange 
their shares with those of the 
buyer or receive cash. One 
potential problem for a foreign 
purchaser is that the law does 
not appeal to contemplate the 
use of foreign shares in the 
exchange transaction. 
Another proposed law will 
permit the shares of affiliates to 
be spun-off to the parent's share-
holders of other entities within 
the corporate group, (on a tax-
free basis), as long as certain 
conditions are met. 
There arc several lessons to 
be learned from the experience 
to date. First, many things have 
changed in significant ways. 
Some of the transactions I have 
referred to would have been 
unimaginable as few as three 
years ago. Additionally, reforms 
in the legal system are shaping 
the business models that are 
emerging. Yet further reforms, 
particularly in the tax system 
and employment arrangements, 
are requited before Japan can 
fully restructure itself. 
Second, there is considerable 
flexibility in structuring a 
transaction and the options will 
increase over time as new legis-
lation takes effect. Some will 
prefer to use the joint venture 
technique as a market entry 
tool in certain instances, but 
M&A is now available as a 
practical method . 
Third, is to reconsider exist-
ing relationships. Since Japanese 
banks no longer provide financ-
ing to their best customers auto-
matically, many are being forced 
to refocus attention on their 
core businesses. 
Fourth, hostile takeovets may 
become more common in Japan. 
Even though M&A Consulting's 
bid for Shoei K.K. did not suc-
ceed, others are bound to fit. 
Last, do not expect Japan to 
be just like America. I do not 
expect that "cut-throat" capital-
ism will be the order of the day, 
There are some signs reform is 
being slowed The delay in rein-
troducing limits on government 
guaranteed bank deposits, the 
failure to enforce consolidated 
tax treatment for subsidiaries, 
and the failure to move forward 
with 4Ul(k) type pension plans 
are examples of this. Further 
efforts will be made to mitigate 
the harsh effects of competition. 
In general, one should expect to 
see a Japan that is more entre-
preneurial and one that is based 
on the rule of law. 
MERIT E. JANOW 
1 would like to offer several 
comparative perspectives. First, 
where is Japan compared to 
global trends in mergers and 
acquisitions? 1999 was the high-
est level of M&A activity in cor-
porate history with 3.4 trillion 
dollars of global M&A. 1.6 tril-
lion was in the United States 
and 1.2 trillion was in Europe. 
The astonishing story is the 
transformation of the European 
corporate landscape and the 
amount of intra-Europe and 
cross-border Europe-U.S M&A 
that is occurring. 
My impression, having spo-
ken with Europeans, is that the 
concern about low PE is affect-
ing very established companies. 
There are consolidations in 
banking, telecommunications, 
and chemicals which appear as 
more strategic rather than finan-
cial acquisitions, and of course 
the effects of economic deregu-
lation and the information tech-
nology revolution are also being 
felt. There are also global con-
centrations or industries in 
which there are consolidations 
resulting in fewer global players. 
From that perspective, where is 
Japan situated? I think what is 
occurring in Japan represents a 
much more modest set of devel-
opments. This does not mean 
Japan is not changing. M&A 
activity in Japan is increasing, 
from a low base, Japan is mostly 
centered in the financial sector 
and not manufacturing, M&A 
is still heavily driven by dis-
tressed sales, but there is a wider 
area of economic activity where 
opportunities are being created. 
This is a new development of 
significance for Japan and also 
for would-be foreign investors. 
More interesting is the 
restructuring occurring within 
the Japanese corporate sector 
a n d new business activity. For 
example, well-established com-
panies are doing on-line bank-
ing. While this is clearly indica-
tive of an economy that is not 
performing well in macro terms, 
it also represents areas of entre-
preneurship and creativity, with 
new efforts to increase efficiency 
where possible. Therefore, gen-
eralizations about Japan are pur-
sued at one's peril if one is a 
potential investor. 
With respect to the regulatory 
environment, I recall doing deals 
in the 1980s where the Japanese 
government could easily chill a 
deal — e.g., if the Ministry o f 
Finance suggested that they might 
have some concerns about a pro-
posed transaction. T h a t is no 
longer part of the environment It 
is a complicated regulatory envi-
ronment with excessive regulations 
and the need for further deregula-
tion, but the interest in foreign 
investment has changed rather 
dramatically. Of course., this is par-
ticularly the case with respect to 
assets or sectors that are distressed. 
The challenge that has been 
alluded to today about emp loy -
ment seems to me the e lephan t 
on the table. Are there new 
management integration meth-
ods being thought through that 
will aid very different types of 
businesses today? Many compa-
nies are integrating thousands 
of Japanese employees, and this 
is a very different kind of chal-
lenge than the traditional 
method of market entry or joint 
venture. This will be the hardest 
part of the puzzle. 
Q & A 
Q: Do you think that a more 
active involvement of the legal 
profession in Japan would help 
increase foreign investment? 
RICHMOND; There is the rule 
of law in Japan and this helps 
commerc ia l investment substan-
tially. Numerous laws and regu-
lations are changing and this 
requires enforcement, and a 
need for people to interpret how 
one behaves correctly in this 
new environment. 1 think one 
needs to argue that a legal- pro-
fession must grow up and around 
the changes. In the financial sec-
tor, a new bankruptcy law will 
have an immense impact on 
how companies can behave with 
respect to their liabilities. Specif-
ically, when GE Capital takes a 
lien on a piece of equipment, we 
want to be able to enforce that 
l ien . There arc very few legal 
resources in Japan that have the 
breadth of experience with respect 
to U.S. and Japanese law and 
accounting standards. I think it 
is a real growth industry. 
MITCHELL: I recently read a 
Japanese businessman's view on 
the law with a literary bend. He 
said the U.S. approach to the 
law is like the Iliad, very long. 
Whereas the Japanese view is 
Haiku, or very short. The U.S. 
system has a very extensive code 
of regulation and we try to lay 
out the rules in great detail to 
give a business the framework in 
which to work. In lapan, there 
are many regulations, but little 
detail. That was done so bureau-
crats could exercise administra-
tive discretion. Lawyers were 
unnecessary for interpretation of 
the laws. That is changing with 
deregulation, which does not 
mean less regulation. More 
lawyers will be necessary to help 
Japan as it moves further away 
from the Haiku-based system. 
MILHAUPT: It is interesting to 
note that in the last several 
years, both Keidanren and the 
Liberal Democratic Party have 
come out with more reform 
proposals stating that the num-
ber of lawyers and judges be 
increased. These groups are nor-
mally not associated with that 
type of law reform, but the rea-
sons given are precisely the ones 
just stated. A transparent mar-
ket-based economy requires a 
certain n u m b e r of th i rd-par ty 
intermediaries who can serve as 
transaction-cost engineers in a 
deal. Japan docs no t seem to 
have enough of those people 
currently to support this level of 
market environment. 
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HEIZO TAKENAKA 
Recently, I attended the World 
Econom ic Forum where a n e w 
keyword was created to describe 
what was happening in the world 
economy. Th i s year it was "com-
placency." This word appeared 
no t on ly in a speech b y the 
Chairman of t he Forum b u t also 
in a speech by President Cl in ton. 
In short , they emphas ized t h e 
strength of the U .S . e c o n o m y 
and the recovery o f Asia from 
econom i c crisis. Under these cir-
cums tances. they proposed w e 
discuss carefully a n d cons t ruc-
tively mo re impor t an t m i d t e r m 
o r long- term prob lems . 
Let roe briefly review what 
h a p p e n e d in U.S.-Japanese rela-
tions in t h e 1990s under the 
Cl in ton adminis t ra t ion . From 
the Japanese perspective, the 
main issue between the t w o 
countr ies has shifted every two 
years. For example, be tween 
1993 and 1995, trade friction 
was the m a i n t o p i c . T h e n , from 
1995 to 1997, security issues 
became t h e impor t an t focus. 
Unfortunately, in this period, 
the rape in Ok inawa was a very 
symbolic event between t he t w o 
countries, and a n e w framework 
for Pacific security was called 
for. From 1997 t o 1999 , the 
mos t ardent discussions be tween 
Japan and the U .S . revolved 
around h o w to avoid a Japanese 
economic crisis. It seems to m e 
that the ma in policy issues 
be tween t he U . S . and Japan has 
changed every two years. 
W h a t comes next? For tun-
ately, an urgent policy agenda 
docs n o t exist be tween t h e t w o 
coun tries. I th ink th is indica tes 
good t i m i n g for discussing 
long- term and cons t ruc t ive 
po l icy agendas, such as h o w to 
manage t he global economy . 
W e n o w have a n e w type o f 
e c o n o m i c crisis. For example, 
the Asian econom ic and finan-
cial crises are show i ng some 
recovery, bu t 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 was a 
miserable year fo r m a n y o f 
these countr ies. W e are no t 
sure w h y they are recovering 
so rapidly. O n e year ago, m a n y 
economists predicted a much 
more modera te recovery. 
Howeve r , t hey are showing a 
mo re rap id grow th rate o f 5 
to 7 pe rcen t . T h i s comes pre-
dominan t ly from the d e m a n d 
side o f the economy , n o t t he 
supply side . T h e y still have 
serious structural prob lems . 
T h e basic s t ance for fiscal 
policy has changed a lot over 
these t w o years. 
Ano ther source of demand 
came from the U .S . and Japan . 
In the Asian-Pacific economy , 
there are t w o special absorbers 
factors to cons ider in th is new 
crisis. First, we need a huge 
a m o u n t of l iqu idi ty to solve it. 
Second , we shou ld cons ider 
well-sequenced pol icies. Policy 
dynamics are impo r tant , b u t the 
order in wh i ch they are adminis-
tered is perhaps more crucial . In 
order to consider po l icy dynam-
ics, we need i n fo rma t ion about 
t h e structure o f the e c o n o m y 
and t he society. In t h a t sense, 
o n e cha l lenging idea is to estab-
l ish a regional mone tary fund. 
now , which I define as negative 
savings. O n e is from the U . S . 
current account deficit and 
ano ther from Japan's fiscal 
deficit. These absorbers are n o t 
sustainable, so we still need a 
solid framework to sustain the 
Asian-Pacific economy . T h e 
impor t an t po in t is that we face a 
new type o f economic crisis. 
His torically speaking, we 
have had m a n y current accoun t 
crises. Today we see a corporate 
account crisis. The re are two 
T w o years ago , the Japanese gov-
ernment suggested estab l ishing 
th is fund b u t the U .S . was 
s trongly agains t it. There are 
many posi t ive and nega t ive 
aspec ts to this idea, b u t o n e 
intricate challenge is t o discuss 
this n e w idea positively. 
N o w is the t ime to start dis-
cuss ing long- term pol icy 
i s sues— fundamen ta l pol icy 
issues. For examp le , w e n o w 
seek an informat ion t echnology 
(IT) revolu t ion . T h i s is n o t a 
simple technological change. It 
is a revolution that will funda-
mentally reshape people's values 
and lifestyles. 
BOWMAN CUTTER 
I think the changes occurring 
in Japan and the rest of the 
world suggest the need to 
rethink the U.S-Japan relation-
ship. First, the big bang is lead-
ing to profound structural 
changes in Japan. The financial 
sector is far more competitive 
and foreign access to the finan-
cial sector is less difficult. 
Second, a decade of slow 
growth has brought about cor-
porate restructuring and the 
emergence of independent capi-
tal (IC). IC is a separate force, 
and I believe that in most gov-
ernments, many policy develop-
ment efforts do not pay enough 
attention to the structure of 
markets and their impact on 
society. Ten years ago, one could 
not have predicted that the 
emergence of IC would be a 
force in restructuring the market 
for corporate control, that is, 
the capacity to buy an interest 
in the control of companies and 
the labor market. Corporate 
spin-offs are beginning to occur. 
Another profound change in 
Japan is the executive move-
ment. In the 1980s, it was 
impossible to recruit a good 
graduate from a good Japanese 
university to work for a corpora-
tion that was not tig-Japan, or 
the Ministry of Finance. At the 
time, Japanese were not inter-
ested in working for a foreign 
company. In the late 1990s, 1 
interviewed 160 people, includ-
ing financial executives from 
investment banks, and had no 
problem finding people to work 
for foreign companies. 
In the 1990s, there was 
also a dawning awareness of 
corporate governance. This 
included a concern for and 
interest in returns, the develop-
ment of an independent board 
of directors, and the interest of 
shareholders. All of these areas 
draw concern today, but they 
are not the total blanks that 
they were ten years ago. 
The third issue is the 
Internet as an unanticipated 
major catalyst for change. The 
Internet could easily have greater 
effects on the Japanese economy 
than the U.S. The Internet 
offers a much more open field 
to entrepreneurs in Japan than 
in the U.S. primarily because 
the major Japanese companies 
are so inflexible and culturally 
bound. For these reasons, the 
Internet is going to have major 
disruptive effects on the rise of 
business to business Internet 
ventures in Japan. 
Because of the enormous 
transaction costs in Japan, the 
cost of carrying out a transaction 
in almost any vertical industry 
sector that I know of, ranges 
from 2-3 times the transaction 
cost in the U.S. Since business 
to business ventures drastically 
cut those kinds of transaction 
costs from the Japanese econ-
omy, it is going to be propor-
tionally much greater in Japan 
than in the U.S. I have seen very 
good work arguing that the 
effect over the next ten years in 
the Internet business-to-business 
in the U.S. will result in an 
increase in the U.S. growth rate 
of around .3 of a percentage 
point. That is a ten percent 
increase in the growth rate of the 
largest economy in the world I 
suspect, just by looking at trans-
action costs and trying to trans-
pose what I know about Japan to 
the analysis I have read about 
the U.S., that the effect will be 
twice for Japan. 
Fourth, there are parallel 
changes occurring within the 
U.S. For example, in terms of 
employment we are simply not a 
manufacturing economy any-
more. The areas of strife that 
dominated the 1980s and the 
early 1990s are less important 
politically. In the past, the 
nature of the economic relation-
ship between the U.S. and Japan 
was essentially trade dominated. 
There were periods when 
macro-economic concerns arose, 
especially in the 1993-1995 
period, but essentially the eco-
nomic relationship between the 
U.S. and Japan was dominated 
by trade for 15-20 years. There 
were profound differences 
between the two economies. 
In my opinion, policy should 
shift over the next few years to 
recognize Japan much more as a 
"normal" economy, moving 
towards more "international 
norms". International norms 
means how an economy is man-
aged and regulated, and what 
kinds of outputs one should 
expect. This implies that the 
issues are going to shift. I think 
the issues will be less bilateral in 
terms of intersectoral bilateral 
disputes between the U.S. and 
Japan. They will be institutional 
and there will be efforts on the 
part of the U.S. to alter and 
improve the anti-trust regimes 
in Japan. Similarly, with other 
areas of regulation, there are 
going to be concerns and efforts 
to harmonize regimes. For 
example, one set of regimes that 
could and should be harmo-
nized is the parallel intellectual 
property systems in Japan. 
When I look at where the 
Japanese economy is likely to be 
in five years, it is not clear to me 
that the discussion of a free-
trade area between the U.S. and 
Japan is going to be on the pol-
icy slate. This does not mean 
that the concerns and quarrels 
will cease to continue. There are 
ongoing areas of great sensitivity 
between the two countries. 
Agriculture is an immense irri-
tant to the U.S. and a deep 
political problem for the 
Japanese. Steel is an irritant to 
the Japanese while it is a politi-
cal problem for the U.S. In 
addition, the dumping regime is 
an enormous problem for the 
U.S. There are going to be 
ongoing sectoral quarrels of this 
kind, and they will fit into the 
overall constellation of U.S.-
Japan concerns. 
YOTARO KOBAYASHI 
I believe the U.S. and Japan 
have a very solid and produc-
tively friendly relationship. 
From time to time, we have 
some sectoral problems, but I 
do not think they will ever grad-
uate to the level of a trade war. 
Despite slow progress in terms 
of economic recovery and struc-
tural reform, I think we will be 
in the open in five years time. I 
think the Japanese economy will 
be performing around the 2 per-
cent range, and if we are really 
aggressive enough in pushing 
growth areas, such as informa-
tion technology and communi-
cations, then we may achieve 
even higher growth rates. 
Further, 1 think that over the 
next 5 to 1O years, and in partic-
ular in terms of the U.S.-Japan 
relationship, the U.S. will con-
tinue to be on top of Japan in 
terms of strength and productiv-
ity. It is very unlikely that the 
U.S. will lose its speed. As long 
as the relationship exists, my 
feeling is that America will con-
tinue to be broadminded, 
patient, and able to solve some 
of the sectoral problems. 
Some of the harshest trade 
relations and problems occur 
not necessarily in real terms, but 
in terms of expressions. There 
was a great concern in the U.S. 
that America was being sur-
passed by others, including 
Japan. In addition, many people 
wrote about Japans status as 
number one, and the great years 
of Japanese business models 
being benchmarked. Many 
Americans did not want to be 
anything other than number 
one. 1 may be exaggerating, but 
I think this element is impor-
tant. I am not saying that Japan 
should indefinitely be number 
two or number three, but in the 
next ten years it is unlikely that 
Japan will surpass the U.S. in 
terms of absolute might. 
If bilateral issues are not of 
great concern, then what are the 
issues? 1 am not an expert in 
security affairs, but I think the. 
question of our individual or 
collective relationship with Asia 
is going to be key and is already 
very important. Within the next 
5 to 1O years, I think the most 
fact that China is going to be a 
part of the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO). Japan would 
like to proceed with that 
process. However, we still do 
not know how the WTO will be 
affected by China's accession, I 
think the U.S., Japan, and other 
leading nations, will have new 
responsibilities in developing 
Chinas membership. 
What role will Japan play? 
Within ten years, we would like 
to be a useful presence—help-
important agenda item for the 
U.S. and Japan will be harness-
ing China. Its potential can seem 
threatening at times, but they 
are going through some difficult 
transitions. It could take a long 
time before China becomes an 
average middle income country. 
Rich and poor zones will con-
tinue to exist in China, and I am 
not sure how direct an impact 
that will have on political stabil-
ity. Nevertheless, it is an element 
and I think we have to contain it 
to a minimum. 
I think Japan welcomes the 
ing to harness China and other 
potential risks. There is an 
actual limit to what Japan can 
do by itself in rebuilding our 
relationship with our Asian 
friends, which is incredibly 
important. However, it would 
be far more difficult to do so 
without the help of the U.S. It 
will be more effective if we 
work together. Japan certainly 
has to continue to assume a 
sensible, responsible, and realis-
tic attitude, as well, in achieving 
these goals. 
GERALD CURTIS 
Let me contrast a forecast for 
Japan's future and a forecast for 
the U.S.-Japan relation's future. 
It seems to me that Japans future 
is comprised of short-term pes-
simism and mid-term optimism. 
On the U.S.-Japan relations pic-
ture, I think we ate hearing 
short-term optimism and mid-
term reasons for concern. 
I think the two morning ses-
sions were very interesting 
because the first session was pes-
simistic and the second session 
was optimistic. Why was there a 
difference? Because the first ses-
sion was about the government 
and the second session was 
about the private sector. This is 
very important. Politicians and 
businessmen are motivated by 
the same desire to survive. The 
difference is that, in order for 
politicians to survive, they try 
not to change anything that 
might adversely affect those 
whose support they depend 
upon. However, business must 
change in order to survive. 
What we see in Japan today is 
the growing recognition in the 
private sector, even among many 
companies that we thought 
would not be able to change, 
that unless they change they will 
become the dinosaurs of the 
Japanese economy. 
I am very optimistic about 
the Japanese economic future 
for two reasons. First, there is 
the emergence of new dynamic 
companies in the information 
technology sector and, second, 
many mainstream companies are 
in the process of remaking 
themselves to survive in the new 
IT driven economy. One thing 
we have learned from the nearly 
150 years of modern Japanese 
history since the Meiji 
Restoration is that Japan has 
never missed a new technologi-
cal wave. And once it has caught 
that wave, it usually has 
improved on the technology it 
imported and sent out the 
improved version to the rest of 
the world. We should be pre-
pared to see a similar pattern 
emerge in response to the infor-
mation technology revolution 
that is now underway. 
One of the advantages Japan 
has today is the unbelievable suc-
cess of the U.S. over the last ten 
years. Ten years ago, the rhetoric 
at a meeting like this would have 
been how Japan and the U.S. are 
both at the frontier of technolog-
ical development, and how Japan 
needs to reform its educational 
system to be innovative. Today 
Japanese are talking a much 
more familiar story of how 
Japan has to catch up with the 
United States, American success 
has created a new catch up goal 
and the Japanese are responding 
with dynamism and enthusiasm 
to that challenge. 
However, look at the gov-
ernment. The politicians are 
trying to hold onto what is 
familiar and retain the support 
of vested interests that have got 
them elected in the past. We 
see a bold rhetoric of reform 
and timid reform policies. The 
positive developments in Japan 
are not being pushed by the 
politicians, but are being 
pushed on the politicians by 
demands from the private sec-
tor. I think this is a new and 
positive development in Japan. 
However one defines the role of 
the state in fostering the old 
industrial revolution in Japan, 
it seems to me indisputable 
that the government is the fol-
lower and not the leader of the 
new IT revolution. This repre-
sents an important shift in the 
balance of power between busi-
ness and government in Japan. 
1 think we will see the shift 
accelerate in the coming years. 
Short term pessimism is a 
consequence of the actions of 
government which acts as a drag 
on the Japanese economy 
because of the many political 
pressures to slow things down to 
serve vested interests. Even here, 
however, there are reasons for 
mid-term optimism. The big 
differentiation between politi-
cians is not between parties, but 
between generations. Regardless 
of which party older politicians 
are affiliated with, many of 
them seem ignorant of what is 
going on in modern Japan, 
including the IT revolution, 
Japan's cultural impact on the 
rest of Asia and other things 
that are new to Japan. 
In contrast, many younger 
politicians seem to be attuned to 
the new values that one can see 
emerging in Japanese society. 
Many of them have been edu-
cated abroad at MIT, Harvard, 
Columbia, and Stanford and 
elsewhere. There are many 
young Japanese politicians who 
will change the face o f Japanese 
politics w h e n the i r day arrives. 
T h e problem with the current 
leadersh ip i n Japan is t h a t t h e y 
are trying to keep their day from 
c o m i n g for as l o n g as possible. 
Japanese society is chang ing far 
faster than politics. Bu t even if 
the rise o f new politicians t o 
power is delayed, the reality is 
that the role of governmen t in 
Japan is shrinking, as it is in 
every advanced country . 
An interesting indicator o f 
the relative decline in the impor-
tance o f governmen t , and t he 
prestige o f a gove rnmen t career, 
is tha t many of the best and 
brightest of the younge r genera-
t ion are opting for careers in t he 
private sector rather than as gov-
ernmen t bureaucrats. Even more 
interest ing and significant is that 
many of t hem desire to work for 
a foreign firm in Japan or for a 
start u p Japanese company i n the 
informat ion technology sector 
rather than for one of the o ld 
m a i n line companies. 
W h e n it comes to US-Japan 
relations, I am op t im is t ic abou t 
the shor t- term prospects because 
there are n o major serious divi-
sive issues in the bilateral rela-
t ionship that are likely to appear 
in the nex t several mon ths . I 
drink in the m id - term there are 
concerns in U.S.-Japan relations. 
It is no t because o f serious fric-
t ions in the bilateral trade or 
econom ic relationship. T h e two 
important challenges for the 
relationship are: h o w to deal 
with potential security threats to 
the relationship arising in Asia; 
and, second, h o w will the U .S . 
deal wi th a g row ing s treng th 
and self-confidence a m o n g 
Asian countr ies , wi th which 
Japan will identify itself. 
Clearly, as Asia becomes more 
prosperous , the relationships 
be tween these countries will 
change . T h e Uni ted States needs 
t o be aware o f h o w t h e dynamics 
of inter-state relations in East 
Asia is changing. O n e impor tan t 
developmen t in Japan's position 
between the U S and cont inental 
East Asia is that Japan is com-
fortable in be ing bo th part o f the 
Wes t and part o f Asia in a m u c h 
more profound way than has 
been true in t h e past. 
O n e hundred years ago, 
Fukuzawa Yuk ich i said Japan 
has t o "get o u t o f Asia" to ge t 
along w i th t h e Wes t . In the 
1930s, the Japanese military said 
the Japanese have to ge t ou t o f 
the Wes t and go back to Asia. 
T h i s pull be tween whether 
Japan is As ian or Wes tern has 
been a perenn ial t heme in 
Japanese modern history. Bu t it 
need n o t b e a theme any longer. 
Younger Japanese in particular 
have squared th is circle in 
Japanese relations w i th the ou t-
side world. Japan is comfor tab ly 
part of the W e s t and a leader o f 
Asia, and the U .S . needs to 
understand that Japan has a role 
to play in Eas t Asia tha t does 
no t necessarily challenge or 
come at the expense o f 
American interests in the region. 
One can identify issues that 
lurk as potent ia l threats t o the 
bilateral relat ionship . T h e y are 
issues o f fundamen ta l differences 
of nat ional interests bu t the dan-
ger o f mispercept ion, misunder-
s tanding, and differing political 
strategics in dealing w i th t h e 
dynamic and potent ial ly uns ta-
ble internat ional s i tuat ion in 
East Asia. As long as we forecast 
con t inued American econom ic 
vitality and a Japanese econom i c 
recovery, and as long sensible 
foreign policies are pursued and 
adequate consul ta t ion be tween 
the US and Japan on regional 
and global issues is under taken, I 
t h i n k w e have every reason t o b e 
opt imist ic about the future of 
the bilateral relationship. 
Q&A 
Q: Suppose tha t peop le work-
ing in t h e field o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
technology in Japan b e c o m e 
ext remely successful and edge-
out U .S . companies , wi l l that 
be a cause for concern? 
TAKENAKA: Trade friction is 
possible at anytime and any-
where. Today, I t h ink it exists in 
the digital electric appliance field. 
In this field, the concept o f the 
winner takes all applies. T h e r e is 
a potential risk for trade friction 
in this field in the very near 
future, a n d the winner will take a 
very large por t ion of t he market. 
CUTTER: I suppose t ha t I can 
say any th ing to w h i c h you could 
invent a scenario for wh ich it 
would b e true . W h a t you are 
trying to do is give a sense o f the 
highest probabili ty ou t come. I 
th ink we have all given the h igh-
est probabili ty ou tcome . W h a t is 
the likelihood o f a scenario that 
you have stated that has a low 
probability outcome? I t h ink 
m u c h lower than historical 
analogies wou ld suggest. C a n it 
happen? O f course. However, 
one very large difference is the 
acceptance in Japan o f the equ i ty 
markets, the nature o f the 
changes that have occurred, and 
the rise o f compan ies tha t 
threaten the incumbents . For 
example, I do n o t believe t h a t 
Sony and Microsoft arc go ing to 
compe te over the nex t decade for 
supremacy in the I T wo r ld . I 
th ink that bo th Sony and Micro-
soft have sufficient n o n - i n c u m -
ben t compe t i tors as well as the ir 
o w n issues to worry abou t . 
CURTIS: I th ink there is a need 
for a reality check. A t this time. 
of unprecedented prosperi ty in 
the United States, there were 
riots in Seattle at the t i m e o f the 
World Trade Organ iza t ion mee t -
ings. There was a huge mobi l iza-
t ion of people opposed to glob-
alization, including labor un ions , 
environmental groups, and 
human rights groups. It does n o t 
take much imagina t ion to t h i n k 
about wha t might happen dur-
ing a t ime o f major recession in 
the U .S . wi th groups mobi l izing 
behind irrational policies. I do 
n o t th ink they will carry the day 
b u t we run a danger r ight n o w 
tha t things are so good it's hard 
to t h ink h o w things can ever b e 
bad. Th ings will n o t always b e 
this good , and there are underly-
ing tensions in this soc ie ty over 
the loss of control over our o w n 
fete. These types of issues are n o t 
comp le tely beh ind us and w e 
will face them again. 
